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breach of duty. The court stated
that under the Ohio forcible entry
and detainer statute (Ohio Rev.
Code § 1923.061(B)), in a landlord's action for nonpayment of
rent, the defendant-tenant may
counterclaim for any amount recoverable under the rental agreement or the LTA. Consistent with
this, the LTA stated that a landlord's forcible entry and detainer
action does not prohibit the tenant
from recovering damages for the
landlord's violation of the rental
agreement or the LTA.
Continued Occupancy Does Not
Waive Damages. The court also
held that a tenant does not waive
the right to recover damages merely because the tenant continues to
pay rent and attempts to convince
the landlord to make repairs, rather than utilizing the LTA remedies.
Even though the Ritchies occupied
the apartment for two years without pursuing the LTA remedies,
this did not indicate their acquiescence to the defective condition of
the apartment. Miller initially
promised to repair the apartment
and the Ritchies repeatedly requested those repairs. The court
stated that as a matter of policy,
those who seek to resolve disputes
without litigation should not be
discouraged by a threat of waiving
their legal rights. Moreover, even if
the Ritchies had acquiesced to the
flawed condition of the apartment,
Miller would not be relieved of his
duty to maintain the apartment in
accordance with the LTA.
Similarly, a tenant's acquiescence does not constitute an enforceable contractual waiver of the
tenant's right to recover damages.
The LTA prohibits any agreement
that purports to relieve the landlord of his duties or to waive the
tenant's right to bring an action for
damages.
Necessary to Recalculate Damages. The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred in
awarding $3,000 in damages to the
Ritchies and $800 to Miller. Although the trial court stated that
the apartment was of no value to
the Ritchies, the court awarded
Miller the full back rent of $800.
The supreme court observed that if
the apartment had no rental value,
Miller was not entitled to an award
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for rent. Conversely, if the property had a value less than the rental
price but greater than zero, the trial
court erred in failing to ascertain
that amount and award damages in
accordance with that finding.
In an effort to sustain the trial
court's award, the Ritchies argued
that the supreme court should either adopt a reduction-in- use measure of damages or find that the
rent was completely abated. The
court rejected this view and reaffirmed Smith v. Padgett, 32 Ohio
St.3d 344, 513 N.E.2d 737 (1987),
a previous decision concerning the
proper measure of damages. The
Padgett court held that where a
landlord breaches a duty to maintain rental property and the tenant
does not make the repairs, the
measure of damages is the difference between the rental value of
the property in its defective condition and the rental value had the
property been maintained. The supreme court in the instant case
found that evidence of reductionin-use can be a relevant factor in
determining damages, but that
damages should be determined by
measuring the effect of the reduction-in-use on the rental value of
the property.
Miller argued that the record did
not contain sufficient evidence
from which to make a damage
award. Rejecting Miller's argument, the court noted that the rent
charged is presumptive evidence of
the rental value of the property
without defects. The Ritchies' undisputed testimony regarding the
extent of the defects was sufficient
evidence on which to base a damage award, despite the fact that the
Ritchies never stated their opinion
as to the value of the defective
property. The finder of fact must
determine the monetary amount
by which the defects and the reduction in use have decreased the
value of the rental property. The
supreme court reversed the court
of appeals and remanded the case
to the trial court for a recalculation
of the damages.
Sheila M. Hanley

THE SUPREME COURT
OF WASHINGTON
REJECTS CLAIMS OF
PATIENT WHO
CONTRACTED AIDS
THROUGH BLOOD
TRANSFUSION
In Howell v. Spokane & Inland
Empire Blood Bank, et. al., 785
P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990), the Supreme Court of Washington ruled
on issues arising from the Plaintiff's contraction of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV")
after receiving a blood transfusion.
The court held that the amendment including AIDS among diseases shielded by the Washington
blood shield statute only applied
prospectively. The court also held
that blood transfers by hospitals
and blood banks are services, and
not sales of goods, and therefore
could not serve as the basis for
strict liability or implied warranty
claims. In addition, the court rejected the patient's Washington
Consumer Protection Act ("CPA")
claims against the hospital and
blood bank.
Background
Virgil T. Howell ("Howell") was
admitted to Deaconess Medical
Center ("Deaconess") in early October of 1984 for elective knee
surgery. After surgery Howell received two units of packed red
blood cells. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank ("the SIEBB")
provided the blood, which a third
party had donated to the SIEBB in
the fall of 1984. One of the units of
blood allegedly was contaminated
with the HIV. Howell himself had
been a lifetime donor to the SIEBB
and in November of 1985, after
Howell donated blood, the SIEBB
learned that Howell tested positive
for HIV. The SIEBB did not inform Howell that he had contracted the HIV until October of 1986.
Howell and his wife, Geraldine
Howell, filed an action in the Superior Court for Spokane County,
Washington, pleading twelve
causes of action against several
defendants, including Deaconess
(continued on page 122)
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and the SIEBB. The Howells sued
Deaconess and the SIEBB on the
theories of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of the
CPA, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, and
loss of consortium. The Howells
also claimed a lack of informed
consent against Deaconess for failing to inform Howell that he could
store his own blood for future
transfusions. The Howells also
sued the SIEBB for negligence per
se, fraudulent concealment and
nondisclosure, and outrage.
The trial court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the
SIEBB and Deaconess on the strict
liability, express and implied warranty, and CPA claims. The trial
court also granted Deaconess partial summary judgment regarding
lack of informed consent, negligence per se, outrage, and res ipsa
loquitur claims against it. The
Howells appealed to the Supreme
Court of Washington for pretrial
review of these orders. The Court
found the trial court's orders unappealable, but nonetheless granted
discretionary review.
The Supreme Court of
Washington
After narrowing the issues, the
Supreme Court of Washington addressed the Howells' claims of
strict liability and breach of implied warranty against the SIEBB
and Deaconess. The court first
addressed whether the 1985
amendment to the blood shield
statute (Wash. Rev. Code §
70.54.120) applied retroactively to
bar claims based on blood transfusions that occurred before the
amendment was enacted. Prior to
the 1985 amendment, the blood
shield statute precluded civil liability against any person, firm, or
corporation who provided blood
transfusions, if their conduct was
not willful or negligent. This statute only applied to liability based
on contracting hepatitis or malaria
through the transfusion. On May
16, 1985, the legislature amended
122

the statute to preclude liability
based on contracting AIDS
through a blood transfusion.
The court initially noted that
statutes are presumed to apply
prospectively unless the legislature
indicates its intent that the statute
apply retroactively, or the statute is
remedial and retroactive application of the statute would further
the remedial purpose. Statutory
amendments also are presumed to
apply prospectively absent a contrary legislative intent or a clear
remedial purpose. A remedial statute or statutory amendment provides a remedy or means to enforce
a right, but does not affect contractual or vested rights.
The court summarily concluded
that neither the blood shield statute nor its 1985 amendment were
remedial. Therefore, to overcome
the presumption application, contrary legislative intent must be
present.
To determine legislative intent,
the court looked to the expressed
language of the statute, the purpose
of the statute, and any legislative
statements made regarding the
statute. It found the text of the
blood shield statute implied a retroactive application. The statute,
as originally enacted, stated that
"nothing in this section shall be
considered by the courts in determining or applying the law to any
blood transfusion occurring before
June 10, 1971, and the court shall
decide such case as though this
section had not been passed."
Laws of 1971, ch. 56, § 1, p. 131.
When the statute was amended in
1985 to provide immunity from
liability for AIDS contracted by
blood transfusion, the June 10,
1971, date was retained. Thus, the
court reasoned that the legislature
intended that the amendment be
retroactively applied to the transfusions occurring on or after June
10, 1971.
The court found that the purpose of the statute was similar to
the purpose of similar blood shield
statutes enacted by forty-eight other states: to encourage a readily
available blood supply. The court
concluded that retroactively applying the statute would further this
purpose. Otherwise, strict liability
actions could be brought against

blood banks and hospitals for
transfusions that took place at a
time when there was no way of
detecting whether blood was infected by HIV.
Although both the language and
purpose of the statute indicated the
legislature intended retroactive application, the court found the general assembly discussions dispositive. Representative Locke stated
that he had "spoken with Senator
Zimmerman, the sponsor of this
legislation, and Senator Granlund,
the Chair of the Senate committee
which considered and passed this
legislation and both have said that
it is their intent that this legislation
apply prospectively." House Journal, 49th Legislature (1985) at
1453-54. Therefore, the court concluded that in spite of the language
and purpose of the statute, the
legislature intended to apply the
amended statute prospectively.
Thus, the Howells' suit was not
precluded by the blood shield statute.
Blood Transfusion: Service or
Sale of Goods?
The court cited a line of cases
holding that strict liability and
breach of implied warranty claims
arise from the sale of goods rather
than services and are actionable
only for defective products, not for
defective services. Thus, in order
to recover their strict liability and
breach of implied warranty claims,
the Howells had to prove the blood
transfusion was a sale of goods and
not a service.
Concerning the claims against
Deaconess, the court held that the
blood transfusion was a service,
not a sale of goods. In following the
view held in a majority of states,
the court reasoned that "[one who
enters a hospital as a patient] goes
there, not to buy medicine or pills,
not to purchase bandages or iodine
or serum or blood, but to obtain a
course of treatment in the hope of
being cured...." Howell, 785 P.2d
at 821. Therefore, the court upheld
the trial court's grant of partial
summary judgment in favor of
Deaconess on the Howells' claims
of strict liability and breach of
implied warranty.
As to the claims against the
SIEBB, the court noted that some
Volume 2, Number 4/Summer, 1990
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jurisdictions have held that blood
banks are distributors of blood
rather than providers of medical
services and therefore subject to
strict liability and breach of warranty claims. The court declined to
make this distinction, citing three
reasons why the purposes of strict
liability would not be furthered
when applied to blood and blood
products: (1) the public needs an
affordable and readily available
blood supply; (2) strict liability
does not promote accident prevention in cases that arose at a time
when no means of screening blood
for HIV existed; and (3) although
blood banks can better distribute
the costs of liability, society's best
interests are not promoted by having the price of a transfusion reflect
its true cost. Therefore, the court
held that, because of these policy
concerns and the fact that the
SIEBB is a nonprofit entity providing a community service, the Howells' strict liability and breach of
warranty claims must fail.
Lack of Informed Consent
The Howells first alleged that,
according to the doctrine of corporate negligence, a hospital has a
duty to obtain informed consent
from its patient. The court noted
that the doctrine of corporate negligence imposes upon hospitals a
duty to exercise reasonable care in
selecting, retaining, supervising
the performance of their medical
staff. The Howells, however, did
not allege that the hospital was
negligent in retaining or supervising Mr. Howell's doctor, but that
the hospital should have obtained
informed consent.
Alternatively, the Howells argued that section 7.70.050 of the
Washington statutes places a duty
upon the hospital to obtain informed consent. Section 7.70.050
subjects health care providers, including hospitals, to liability for
failure to obtain informed consent.
The court concluded, however,
that section 7.70.050 does not impose equal informed consent obligations upon hospitals and physicians. The court reasoned that
imposing equal obligations would
be unjust where, as here, the hospital had no specific knowledge regarding Howell's condition, only
Volume 2, Number 4/Summer, 1990

general knowledge of the risk applicable to all patients. The physician, rather than the hospital, more
appropriately bears the obligation
of informing the patient of such
general risks. Therefore, the court
upheld the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of Deaconess on
the informed consent claim.

transfused the blood. Therefore,
the res ipsa loquitur claim failed
because no one party exclusively
controlled the blood from which
negligence could be inferred.
Joseph J. Morford

Consumer Protection Act Claims
To establish a Washington CPA
claim, the plaintiff must establish
the following: "(1) the act or practice must be unfair or deceptive;
(2) the action had to occur in the
conduct of trade or commerce; (3)
there must be a sufficient showing
of public interest; (4) there must be
an injury to plaintiffs business or
property; and, (5) there must be a
causal link between the unfair acts
and the injury suffered." Howell,
785 P.2d at 823.
With respect to the SIEBB, the
court found no causal link between
the SIEBB's alleged failure to
promptly notify Howell that the
SIEBB had detected HIV in Howell's blood sample and Howell's
initial transfusion because the
transfusion occurred before the
SIEBB discovered the information.
Therefore, the SIEBB did not cause
Howell's injury as a matter of law.
As to Deaconess, the court found
that because Deaconess had no
duty to obtain an informed consent, there was nothing unfair or
deceptive in failing to do so. Therefore, the CPA claim against Deaconess also failed as a matter of
law.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Finally, the court addressed the
Howells' claim against Deaconess
based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. For res ipsa loquitur to
apply, "(1) the occurrence producing the injury must be of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence; (2) the
injury is caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
(3) the injury causing occurrence
must not be due to any contribution on the part of the plaintiff."
Howell, 785 P.2d at 824. The court
noted that an anonymous person
donated the blood, the SIEBB collected the blood, and Deaconess
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